Intelligent systems are faced with the problem of securing a principled relationship between the world and its internal representation. I propose a uni ed approach to visual representation, based on Shepard's (1968) notion of second-order isomorphism. According to the proposed theory, a shape is represented by its similarity to a number of reference shapes, measured in a high-dimensional space of elementary features. The result is a philosophically appealing, computationally feasible and formally veridical representation of a distal shape space, which addresses the needs of shape categorization and can be used to derive a range of models of perceived similarity.
1 Introduction and overview A common assumption underlying the theories of vision is that a representation of the world | a geometrical replica (Marr, 1982) , and possibly also a ordances relevant to the required repertoire of actions (Gibson, 1966) | should be delivered to the decision-making stage of an intelligent system, natural or arti cial. Barring the possibility of an immediate, extrasensory access to the structure of the world, achieving principled correspondence between the representation and the world is a challenging philosophical and computational problem.
A formal basis for representation
A major philosophical aspect of the problem of representation amounts to the question how, in principle, is representation possible. To put it simply, by virtue of what does the representational state of an observer seeing a cat on a mat refer to that cat? Traditionally, the principle assumed to support (veridical) representation in vision has been similarity. According to this view, which originated with Aristotle, an internal entity represents an external object by virtue of resemblance or isomorphism between the two: the representation of a tomato has something of the redness and of the roundness of the real thing.
Echoes of this idea, inherited by Berkeley and Hume from the Scholasts, can be found in presentday sources: \Representation of something is an image, model, or reproduction of that thing" (Suppes et al., 1994) . Indeed, the predominant theories of visual shape representation still speak about isomorphism: typically, it is assumed that structural (Biederman, 1987) or metric (Ullman, 1989) information stored in the brain re ects corresponding properties of shapes in the world. In comparison, no student of color vision seriously believes that representations of tomatoes are red, or even that the re ectance spectra of tomatoes are explicitly stored; this has been supplanted by the feature detector theory, according to which the response of internal mechanisms tuned to particular sensory stimuli constitute the basic representation for those stimuli. A major goal of the present paper is to show that shape too, over and above color or local orientation, can be encoded in a low-dimensional feature space.
An important step towards understanding the principles of representation has been made by Roger N. Shepard (1968) , who pointed out that instead of a rst-order isomorphism between the shapes and their representations, it makes more sense to expect a second-order isomorphism between similarities of shapes and similarities of the internal representations they induce: \: : : the isomorphism should be sought | not in the rst-order relation between (a) an individual object, and (b) its corresponding internal representation | but in the second-order relation between (a) the relations among alternative external objects, and (b) the relations among their corresponding internal representations. Thus, although the internal representation for a square need not itself be square, it should (whatever it is) at least have a closer functional relation to the internal representation for a rectangle than to that, say, for a green ash or the taste of a persimmon," (Shepard and Chipman, 1970, p.2) . Essentially, this is a call for representation of similarity instead of representation by similarity (see Figure 1 ).
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A computational theory of veridical representation
How is the idea of representation of similarity to be approached computationally? It is not enough merely to postulate, as Gibson did, that the relevant information is picked up, without specifying the computational underpinnings of the pick-up process (Ullman, 1980; Marr, 1982) . In the case of representation by similarity, the pick-up of external information amounts to a reconstruction of the visual world. Although it is quite easy to state, the reconstructionist goal is notoriously di cult to attain computationally, as signi ed by the limited success of Marr's research program in computer vision, and by the calls for alternative paradigms (Bajcsy, 1988; Aloimonos, 1990) . Fortunately, as we shall see, reconstruction is not necessary, if representation of similarity is designated as the goal of the visual system.
Computationally, the problem of representation can be addressed on several levels (cf. Marr, 1976) . On the abstract level, the concern is to come up with an appropriate mathematical formulation, which would make the representation well-posed and tractable. The idea of second-order isomorphism does lead, in fact, to a well-de ned computational notion of representation: according to this idea, to represent a collection of objects means to re ect in a consistent manner any change that an object may undergo.
By and large, this notion of representation is conceptually orthogonal to the reconstructionist approach: the tokens standing for objects need not resemble the objects themselves (see Figure 1) . Although representation by second-order isomorphism does reduce to plain reconstruction if the represented quantities correspond to distances among densely spaced points situated on the surface of an object (S. Ullman, personal communication) , such a reduction is unwarranted; apart from placing a heavy computational burden on the perceptual system, it serves no useful purpose. As noted in (Shepard and Chipman, 1970) , \it only attempts the absurdity of putting o until later the whole process of pattern recognition that must by de nition precede the pivotal event in question" (i.e., the delivery of a representation capable of supporting perceptual judgment and categorization).
On the algorithmic level, representation by second-order isomorphism calls for assuring that the similarities between (necessarily proximal) perceived entities correspond in some orderly fashion to the distal similarities between objects. Now, a mechanism tuned to a particular shape provides a convenient way to estimate the similarity between the current stimulus and a reference one, if its response falls o monotonically with the extent of the (distal) deviation of the current stimulus from the preferred one. This monotonic relationship between proximal and distal similarities provides the required algorithmic basis for veridical representation: as in nonmetric multidimensional scaling (Shepard, 1962; Kruskal, 1964) , the rank order of the proximal similarities, being the same as the rank order of the distal similarities, allows the recovery of the distal con guration of the stimuli in some underlying parametric space (Edelman, 1995b) .
On the implementational level, the challenge is to identify a mechanism (biological or arti cial), capable of responding selectively to certain shapes. A generic connectionist classi er, trained on the recognition of a particular class of objects, provides the required implementational substrate; a particular classi cation architecture (namely, the regularization networks of Poggio and Girosi, 1990 ) may be preferred on the grounds of biological plausibility.
An adequate computational solution, spanning all three levels, would exert a decisive in uence on the philosophical outlook of the problem of representation. At the very least, familiar dogmas would have to be reassessed, and the relative merit of competing proposals reevaluated. The developments of the recent years in the computational, psychophysical, and neurobiological studies of visual representation suggest that the time for such a revision has come. In the remainder of this paper, I survey some of the relevant developments, and suggest a possible manner in which they can be related to some of the current views on the issue of representation in the philosophy of mind.
2 Representation of similarity: some preliminaries I now proceed to describe in detail the computational-level approach to representation, outlined in the introduction. A standard answer to the central question at this level | what to represent? | is, not surprisingly, \shape." The surprise comes with the realization that an alternative answer is both plausible and preferable. The approach expounded below, which is closely related to Shepard's (1968) idea of representation by second-order isomorphism, o ers such an alternative answer: represent similarity between shapes, not the geometry of each shape in itself.
2.1 A metric space as a substrate for similarity My basic assumption is that similarity between objects can be de ned via an embedding of the objects into a metric space, where it is equated with the distance between the points corresponding to each object. This de nition of similarity seems to fall short of explaining such prominent phenomena in the perception of similarity as subjectivity, task dependence, and asymmetry (Tversky, 1977; Tversky and Gati, 1978; Nosofsky, 1991; Medin et al., 1993) . The shortcomings are, however, only super cial. In particular, while the metric-space model makes it possible to speak about objective distal similarity (a prerequisite for a realist ontology of visual shapes), the perceptual system of the observer can warp the objective similarity space, according to his or her or its idiosynchrasies, and to the dictates of the task (Harnad, 1987; Goldstone, 1994) . Furthermore, similarity need not remain restricted by the symmetry that it inherits from the underlying distance function; the metricspace model can be considered a starting point for a more realistic de nition. Indeed, as I shall argue in section 5, a distance-based de nition of similarity does not preclude one from modeling a considerable variety of similarity-related phenomena in human perception.
Under second-order isomorphism, changes of shapes, and not the shapes themselves, are to be represented. According to the metric-space model suggested above, changing a shape then corresponds simply to a movement of the point encoding the shape in an appropriate parameter space (the shape space). To enable metamorphosis within a certain class of objects, all the members of that class must admit a common parameterization. Although a common low-dimensional parameterization may be sought for the entire spectrum of possible shape morphing, from a sea horse to a grand piano, it is di cult to expect that a structure of similarities common to sh and to musical instruments will carry over into a cognitive system (the need to judge the similarity between objects from such widely disparate categories arises quite rarely, if ever). Di erent object classes may, therefore, be encoded by di erent sets of parameters. This amounts to the presupposition of the existence of individually parameterized natural kinds (Quine, 1969) of shapes.
Shape spaces
The idea that objects belonging to a given natural kind can be given a common parameterization has led to the emergence of the concept of a shape space in parallel, in a number of applied disciplines, ranging from biological morphometrics to computational molecular biology. In addition, concepts related to that of a shape space have been de ned in di erent mathematical disciplines, such as statistics, complex analysis, and algebraic geometry.
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to the construction of a low-dimensional shape space 1 1 A default high-dimensional parameterization common to any two 3D shapes can be obtained by \shrink-wrapping," a procedure available in modern graphics software. According to this method, a mesh is wrapped in turn around each object, yielding correspondence between like points on the objects' surfaces. The objects can then be morphed into is based on the notion of landmarks { ducial points a xed to the object, whose location determines the object's shape (Bookstein, 1991) . An orderly study of the geometry of shape spaces de ned by locations of points has been initiated only recently, by D. G. Kendall (1989) , who pointed out that the notion of a shape must include a speci cation of the transformations which, by de nition, leave the shape invariant. In Kendall's shape spaces, where objects are rigid con gurations of points, a natural assumption is to de ne shape up to the action of the orthogonal group of transformations (that is, rigid motions plus re ection). From this, it follows that dissimilarity between two sets of points is to be measured by the Procrustes distance, de ned by the sum of squares of residual distances between corresponding points, remaining after an optimal orthogonal mapping matching one set to the other has been applied (Borg and Lingoes, 1987) . Interestingly, shape spaces de ned in this manner have a non-trivial topology, are not at, and contain singularities; furthermore, the local Riemannian metric that takes these properties into account determines a global metric which is identical to the Procrustes distance (Carne, 1990; Le and Kendall, 1993) .
In some cases, it may be desirable to de ne shape up to a group of transformations that is less restrictive than the orthogonal group, or, in other words, to allow deformation. 2 In that case, a suitable framework for the de nition of a shape space is provided by the theory of Riemann surfaces (Krushkal', 1979) . Speci cally, any two surfaces (shapes) of a given genus related by a conformal mapping can be considered equivalent (belonging to the same class), with a quasiconformal mapping taking one shape class into another. 3 The resulting shape space (known as the Teichm uller space) possesses a Riemannian metric, de ned by the deviation of the quasiconformal mapping from conformality (Krushkal', 1979) . The Teichm uller space can be parameterized by a small set of real numbers, which provide a possible coordinate system for the resulting shape space (Sundararaman, 1980) . The upshot of the preceding brief survey is that the notion of a shape space can be given any of a number of alternative mathematical formulations, each bringing with it useful tools such as distance, and the related concepts of geodesics, shape classes, etc. The concept of distance between shapes is, in turn, a crucial ingredient in the representation of similarity. The possibility of a principled quanti cation of shape similarity addresses the rst problem faced by the proposed theory of representation: what to represent. 4 The next question | how to communicate similarity relationships induced by a given shape space structure across the gap separating the world from the observer | is addressed in the following section. each other, with the common high-dimensional parameterization de ned by the coordinates of the vertices of the mesh. Low-dimensional parameterizations are, however, preferable on computational grounds.
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Our perception of the thing suspended from the tree branch in Dali's Persistence of Memory as a deformed clock rather than an uninterpretable shape attests to the perceptual equivalence of some shapes related by deformations rather than transformations. A mapping realized by an analytic function with a non-vanishing Jacobian in a given region is conformal there (Cohn, 1967) . A regular topological mapping is quasiconformal if there exists a constant q, 1 q < 1, such that almost any in nitesimally small sphere is transformed into an ellipsoid for which the ratio of the largest semiaxis to the smallest one does not exceed q (Reshetnyak, 1989) . Intuitively, a conformal mapping is locally an isometry; a quasiconformal mapping is locally a ne. 4 The concomitant problem of alternative parameterizations will be treated in section 3.3.1 below. 6 3 Representation of similarity: the problem 3.1 Levels of representation of similarity Given that objects are identi ed with points in some underlying metric space, it is natural to consider the process of representation as a mapping into another metric space. One may now ask what properties must the mapping possess for the image of the original shape space to qualify as its faithful representation.
Distinctness. The minimal requirement appears to be that the mapping be one to one, so that distinct points in the original space S are mapped to distinct points in the representation space R. 5 To realize the implications of limiting the representational requirements to distinctness, note that a major reason for maintaining internal representations is generalization: any system, at any point in time, will have encountered only a nite number of (labeled or rewarded) stimuli; for any other stimulus, the response will have to be generalized, based on memory traces of past experiences with related stimuli (Shepard, 1987) . A representation whose delity is limited to distinctness provides no basis for generalization, because it does not contain information concerning relationships between stimuli, beyond the identity of each of them.
Nearest-neighbor preservation. A modicum of generalization capability can be provided if one requires that the representation mapping preserve the nearest neighbor structure prevailing in the original space. In this case, two points that are nearest neighbors of each other before the mapping remain so after the mapping. This kind of representation preserves the rough structure of categories, if these are available in the original space (e.g., in the form of natural kinds). The category membership, in turn, provides a basis for generalization.
Full similarity spectrum preservation. If the identity of the k'th nearest neighbor of each point is preserved for some k > 1, the resulting representation will be in closer correspondence with the original space. At the limit, when the rank order of all interpoint distances, for any nite set of points, is fully preserved, the representation mapping becomes, for all practical purposes, a similitude. The original shape-space con guration of the points can then be recovered from the distance rank information, up to rigid motion (Shepard, 1962; Kruskal, 1964; Shepard, 1980; Borg and Lingoes, 1987) . A representation that possesses this degree of delity can support categorization at a number of levels, including the determination of the identity of the stimulus, and not only of its class (see section 5).
The above hierarchy is clearly not the only possible way to de ne the delity of the representation mapping. If the representation is to be used mainly for classi cation, one may require that points that are separable under some parametric decision surface in the original space remain so following the mapping (this is in contrast with the distance-based requirements, which are nonparametric). For example, if points in the original shape space tend to form linearly separable clusters, one may require that the clusters remain linearly separable under the mapping. Moreover, one may also require that clusters that are not originally linearly separable become so under the mapping (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995) . These considerations are beyond the main concern of the present 5 It is di cult to impose this requirement over all possible objects, unless the dimensions along which objects can vary are known in advance. Thus, any perceptual system is prone to the error of omission caused by the necessarily nite set of measurements that span its internal representational space.
section, which is to specify a minimal computational basis for the processes that operate on the representation space. Still, if the original-space con guration of stimuli allows an e cient remapping making explicit an underlying structure of linearly separable clusters, this possibility must remain open following the mapping into the representation space. Obviously, whereas the lowest-delity (distinction-preserving) representation does not necessarily preserve such properties, the highestdelity (similarity-preserving) representation does.
3.2 Constraints on the distal-to-proximal mapping M Let us consider the constraints on the distal to proximal mapping M implied by the assumption that a representation is faithful to the extent that it preserves similarity ranks. The similarity ranking of three distinct parameter vectors x; y; z 2 R n can be formalized via the notion of their simple ratio, de ned as hx ; y ; zi = jx ? yj=jy ? zj. Obviously, a mapping S : R n ! R n preserves distance ranks i it preserves hx ; y ; zi for any choice of points. A bijective mapping S with this property must be a similitude, that is, a mapping of the form S(x) = P (x), where > 0; 2 R, and P : R n ! R n is an orthogonal transformation (Reshetnyak, 1989) . Thus, the requirement of global rank preservation is quite restrictive in the class of mappings it allows. Locally, the rank preservation requirement is satis ed by any well-behaved (that is, smooth and invertible) mapping (Cohn, 1967) . Such mappings are conformal, that is, they preserve angles, and, therefore, also the similitude of small triangles. In particular, a scalene triangle formed by a triplet of points in a distal shape space will be mapped into a triangle with the same ranking of side lengths in the proximal representation space (see Figure 1 ). In higher dimensions, conformality is very restrictive. As proved by Liouville in 1850, already for n = 3 there are no everywhere conformal mappings from R n to itself besides those which are composed of nitely many inversions with respect to spheres, or M obius transformations. These constitute a nite-dimensional Lie group which includes the group of rigid motions in R n and is only slightly broader than that group (Reshetnyak, 1989) .
A considerably broader class of mappings emerges if the requirement of conformality is replaced by that of quasiconformality (recall that a regular topological mapping is quasiconformal if it transforms almost any in nitesimally small sphere into an ellipsoid of bounded eccentricity; see Reshetnyak, 1989 ). Under such a mapping, the ranks of distances between points are preserved approximately, on a small scale (V ais al a 1992, p.124). The relevance of quasiconformality to the representation of real-world shapes stems from the realization that distance ranks need not be preserved globally, across the entire shape space, but rather within shape classes (just as the common parameterization that is the basis for the de nition of distal similarity is required to hold within, but not extend across, the boundaries of natural kinds).
Component-wise analysis of M
How likely is a mapping M, implemented by a typical visual system, to meet the above requirements for distance rank preservation? Such a mapping can be described generically as M = f 4 f 3 f 2 f 1 , where the rst two components, f 1 and f 2 , are dictated by the properties of the world, and the other two constitute part of the system: Geometry. The function f 1 (p) maps the distal parameter-space description p of the object into its geometry (e.g., the coordinates of the vertices of a ne mesh, suitable for rendering by a graphics system).
Imaging. The function f 2 (p; z) maps the object's geometry into the image on the receptor surface of the visual system. Its dependence on the shape parameters p is determined by the prior action of f 1 and is written down explicitly for convenience; the dependence on the viewing conditions z is, however, peculiar to f 2 . Measurements. The function f 3 (p; z) corresponds to the set of internal measurements performed on the image. In a typical model of vision, each measurement stage consists of convolution with a number of lters, followed by the application of a nonlinearity.
Dimensionality reduction. The function f 4 (p) maps the measurement space into a low dimensional representation of the shape space, while removing the dependence on the viewing conditions z.
Geometry mapping and the possibility of di erent parameterizations
Consider rst the e ect of the geometry mapping, f 1 . The properties of this mapping are to be de ned with respect to a family of possible parameterizations of the distal shape space, rather than with respect to some illusory true and unique parameterization. Let P be the set of all parameterizations related to a given one p 0 by some conformal mapping T . The set P is an equivalence class (V ais al a, 1971); moreover, because the composition T M is conformal if M is, veridical representation of some p 2 P is equivalent to the representation of any other p 2 P. Now, a conformal mapping M will give rise to a proper (i.e., second-order isomorphic) representation of object clustering under all parameterizations belonging to some class P x . The nature of that class will depend on the nature of the mapping (which can emphasize some distances among objects at the expense of others, with or without altering the distance ranks). A system that is a product of natural selection is expected to have evolved a mapping better suitable for the representation of those aspects of its habitat most important for its survival and behavior. Thus, while veridical representation is possible, it is also possible that two perceptual systems implementing di erent mappings will have incompatible (or even con icting) pictures of the world.
It is worth noting that the e ect of di erent distal to proximal mappings (as implemented, e.g., by two perceptual systems) cannot be distinguished from that of di erent parameterizations (which are, in any case, merely tools for formalizing the notion of representation, as are many other mathematical idealizations of reality). A parametric structure of the world is never perceived directly, but always through the more or less distorting channel of the distal to proximal mapping. If that channel lets some of the original dimensions of variation of stimuli collapse, the resulting representation runs the risk of not satisfying even the distinctness requirement, stated above. For example, in achromats, the perceptual dimensions of color are projected out of existence, giving rise to the emergence of a perceptual system separated from that of a normal person by a gap which cannot be bridged. A more complicated situation may arise when the transformation relating two representations is invertible but highly distorting. In that case, two systems may have widely di erent but not unbridgeable grasps on the world. Two stimuli which normally appear similar to one of the systems would seem dissimilar to the other. Two examples are the \other race" e ect in face recognition (Brigham, 1986) , and the distinction between the l and the r sounds, as it is perceived by a native speaker of Japanese, vs. a native speaker of English.
The role of invariances
The next component of M { the viewing mapping, f 2 { introduces a dependence on variables z which are extraneous to the shape parameters that are to be represented. These variables encode the pose of the object with respect to the observer, to the light sources, and to the other objects in the scene. Their in uence must be counteracted by the perceptual system, through the combined action of measurement and dimensionality reduction, f 4 f 3 , to reduce the likelihood of two nearby parameter-space points (i.e., two similar shapes) being mapped into widely disparate points in the nal representation space. Note that absolute invariance with respect to these variables is not necessary; it is only required that shape-space changes in uence the measurements more strongly than view-space changes (more on this in section 4). Furthermore, not all the dimensions of z have to be treated by the same mechanism: image-plane translation can be compensated for by a covert shift of attention (Anderson and Van Essen, 1987) or an overt one (such as a saccadic eye movement), variation in apparent size | by global scaling using a hard-wired mechanism (Schwartz, 1985) , and rotation in depth | by learning an appropriate normalizing mapping speci c for each object class (Poggio and Edelman, 1990) .
As already noted, the preservation of distance ranks implies that any change in the distal parameter space must be re ected in the nal low-dimensional representation (if some of the original dimensions collapse under the representation, distances between points are likely to be distorted). To ensure that as many as possible of the original dimensions of variation among the distal objects are preserved, it is worthwhile to make as many varied measurements as possible. This makes the measurement space (de ned by the action of f 3 ) high-dimensional, and necessitates subsequent dimensionality reduction (through the action of f 4 ). In a exible system, dimensionality reduction would have to involve learning to nd informative dimensions, depending on the statistics of the input and (if available) of additional knowledge provided by the environment (for an introduction to this aspect of representation, see, e.g., Intrator, 1993). 4 Representation of similarity: a solution 4.1 Representation = measurement + dimensionality reduction
We have seen that veridical representation is theoretically possible, insofar as a low-dimensional subspace isomorphic (in Shepard's sense) to a distal shape space can be extracted from the highdimensional space of measurements performed by the system. This situation is illustrated schematically in Figure 2 . The input to an object recognition system { an n n image { can be considered as a point in a n 2 -dimensional image or raster space R = R n 2 (in biological vision, one may think of the space of patterns transmitted by the optic nerve to the brain). The task of a representational system is, given a pattern X 2 R, to determine the location of X in a proximal shape space S R.
Place Figure 2 here The problem of locating X within S is analogous to the problem of determining the exact location of a point on a terrain, which arises in navigation and in the preparation of topographical maps. In topography, this problem can be solved by triangulation: the location of the point is computed from bearings taken to a number of landmarks whose coordinates are known. Likewise, the location of a point in the shape space can be found from its disposition with respect to a number of reference points, known to belong to the same space (\terrain"). This approach leads to a straightforward implementation of representation by second-order isomorphism, as described in the next section.
A Chorus of Prototypes
The main di erence between triangulation in topography and in cognitive modeling is the quantity measured to provide the location of the test point. In topography it is easy to measure direction; in a cognitive model, distance (actually, a quantity monotonically related to distance). Consider a generic connectionist classi er, trained on instances of a certain shape class, corresponding to a reference point in the shape space. If the response of such a classi er is approximately constant over the range of di erent viewing conditions z, and falls o gradually and monotonically with parameter-space distance from its stimulus (see Figure 3) , it can be used to pinpoint the location of the test stimulus in the shape space, by a process related to triangulation and to nonmetric multidimensional scaling (Edelman, 1995b) .
Note that a number of classi ers, each tuned to a di erent reference point, must be activated (just as in triangulation a number of landmarks must be used for each measurement). Now, an ensemble or a Chorus (Edelman, 1995b ) of k classi ers maps the distal shape space to a proximal representation space, R k . If the response of each classi er degrades gracefully with the dissimilarity between the test stimulus and the preferred shape, the entire ensemble realizes a mapping M which is smooth and regular. Thus, the distal to proximal mapping is quasiconformal (as is any di eomorphism restricted to a compact subset of its domain; Zorich 1992, p.133) and can, therefore, serve as a substrate for veridical representation of the original parameter space, as argued in section 3.2.
There are at least two reasons to use a bank of classi ers rather than raw measurement-space distances to reference points. First, representing a stimulus by the responses of classi ers each of which is nonlinear (e.g., Gaussian, as in the regularization networks of Poggio and Girosi, 1990) in the measurement-space distance between the stimulus and some reference object introduces features polynomially related to the original measurement variables. 6 This may simplify subsequent classi cation, by nonlinearly enriching the representation space and making the possibility of linear separation between classes more likely (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995) .
The second, more important reason is the possibility to train a classi er to ignore those directions in the measurement space that are irrelevant to the identity of the stimulus (e.g., directions corresponding to changes in the viewpoint parameters z). Connectionist modelers have realized in the past that the e ect of moving away from a stored exemplar in a representation space depends on the direction of movement, if the space of admissible exemplars is a low-dimensional manifold immersed in the representation space (Simard et al., 1992) . Speci cally, moving along a tangent to that manifold should incur a smaller generalization cost than moving in perpendicular to it. This insight has been incorporated into algorithms that train for invariance by di erential reinforcement of stimuli removed in the tangent and the normal directions to the target manifold. In Chorus, invariance is not a goal, but rather a precondition that must be ful lled for the resulting representation to be veridical. Furthermore, absolute invariance is not necessary: it su ces that the structure of categories, as de ned by an appropriate metrics in the low-dimensional proximal representation space, not be distorted by the irrelevant components of distance, measured along the extraneous dimensions z.
Training classi ers for particular stimuli, as it is done in Chorus, can be interpreted as downplaying the irrelevant dimensions by switching from the measurement-space metrics to a representationspace metrics, induced by the class identities (Baxter, 1995) . This property of the space spanned by the outputs of classi ers is important for devising better classi cation schemes. A typical example is vector quantization | a representational scheme in which the location of a point in a multidi-mensional space is coded by the identity of its nearest neighbor, chosen from a small set of points covering the space. In Baxter's (1995) canonical vector quantization, the distances to the covering points are computed according to the classi er metrics, and not the raw vector space metrics.
In comparison to the canonical vector quantization, in Chorus the primary goal is representation, not classi cation. Accordingly, the computational question to be addressed is not whether the nearest-neighbor structure makes more sense when measured in the classi er space compared to the measurement space, but rather to what extent the classi er-space distance structure of an arbitrary set of points re ects the corresponding structure in some low-dimensional distal parameterization. A preliminary empirical exploration indicates that classi er-space distances are indeed likely to behave in the desirable fashion (Duvdevani-Bar and Edelman, 1995) . The mathematical reason behind this property of Chorus may be its relationship to a powerful method of dimensionality reduction (Bourgain, 1985; Linial et al., 1994) , in which points belonging to a multidimensional space are embedded into a space of much lower dimensionality, while preserving to a large extent the original interpoint distances. In Bourgain's embedding of a nite set of points, the locations of the points in the new space are encoded by their distances to randomly chosen subsets of the original set, which serve as reference entities. In Chorus, too, distances to reference points are measured: the response of a classi er trained on a reference pattern constitutes such a measurement, with the added advantage of tuning out the irrelevant dimensions. Thus, the employment of classi ers in Chorus makes Bourgain's principle of dimensionality reduction applicable in a situation where \noise" dimensions abound.
Place Figure 3 here 5 Uses of similarity
In the preceding section, we saw that the output of a Chorus of classi ers constitutes, under certain conditions, a veridical representation of a distal shape space to which the individual reference classes belong. I now turn to examine the extent to which this representation can be put to use in modeling the perception of similarity and its role in categorization. In this section, I will show that (1) the responses of a number of classi ers acting in parallel can serve as a substrate for carrying out classi cation at di erent levels of categorization, depending on the manner in which these responses are processed, and (2) if the saliency of individual classi ers in distinguishing between various stimuli is kept track of and is taken into consideration depending on the task at hand, then similarity between stimuli in the representation space can be made asymmetrical and non-transitive, in accordance with Tversky's general contrast model of similarity (Tversky, 1977) .
Similarities at di erent levels of categorization
To understand the potential of the multiple-classi er representation to support shape categorization, it is necessary to consider the requirements of the relevant tasks at the di erent category levels.
Basic level
At the basic category level (Rosch et al., 1976) , we are interested in the identity of the class C j that is the closest neighbor of the stimulus X within the shape space S. In some cases, the identities of several closest neighbors may be required (see Figure 4 , middle). The stress here is not on the number of neighboring class prototypes involved in the categorization, but on the reliance on the identity of these classes, rather than on their disposition relative to the stimulus in the shape space (that information will be required for subordinate-level categorization).
The major obstacle to be overcome at the basic level is the dependence of X on factors such as illumination and viewpoint, in addition to the category membership index j. If C j is taken to correspond to the image of a member of j in some canonical orientation, the viewing conditions can be seen to span a view space V j , which is transversal to the class space C, and pierces it at C = C j (see Figure 2) . A general-purpose function approximation module (Poggio and Edelman, 1990) trained to perform the mapping T (j) : V j ! C j can perform basic-level categorization, because its response can be made largely independent of the viewing conditions. The stimulus, then, is assigned to the category of the strongest-responding module.
Subordinate level
At the identity level, the task is to determine the exact location of the stimulus within the shape space, rather than its nearest neighbor(s) in the collection of known class prototypes. The central problem here lies in the ne resolution that must be attained despite the residual misalignment left over from the action of the normalizing transformation T . This problem can be approached by learning hyperacuity in the instance space. In hyperacuity-related visual tasks such as vernier discrimination (Westheimer, 1981) , spatial resolution better than the spacing of the photoreceptors on the retina is attained by combined action of graded overlapping receptive elds (Snippe and Koenderink, 1992) .
In shape-space localization, the response pro le of each of the classi ers in Chorus de nes a \receptive eld" over the space S. The vector of responses of a number of classi ers (Figure 4 , right) contains the information necessary for localizing the stimulus within S, as argued in section 4.
Moreover, because of graded nature of each response pro le and the overlap between the di erent shape-space receptive elds, the localization is likely to be much more precise than what would have been possible if the responses of the classi ers were considered individually, in precise analogy to the spatial hyperacuity. The required insensitivity of shape-space localization to viewpoint transformations stems from two sources. First, experience shows that hyperacuity can be attained despite considerable random misalignment of the stimulus as a whole, relative to its \home" or training pose, probably due to the shallow and overlapping pro les of the individual receptive elds (Poggio et al., 1992) . Second, explicit training for invariance with respect to \irrelevant" transformations can complement the inherent tolerance of the receptive-eld system. Importantly, once learned from examples, the normalizing transformation T (j) can work even for stimuli not previously encountered by the system, provided that they belong to the same class as the examples used for training. The simplest approach here is to apply to a novel stimulus a transformation that is the average of the normalizing transformations learned for the class to which the stimulus belongs (Lando and Edelman, 1995).
Superordinate level
Consider now two tasks at a less speci c level in a hierarchy of recognition tasks. The rst of these is to decide whether X is the image of some (familiar) object. For this purpose, it would su ce to represent the shape space S as a scalar eld over the image space S(X) : R ! R, which would express for each X its degree of membership in S. For example, one may set S = max i fp i g (the activity of the strongest-responding prototype module), or shape = P i p i (the total activity, as in Figure 4 , right; cf. Nosofsky, 1988) .
The second task is to characterize a superordinate-level category of the input image, and not merely decide whether it is likely to be the image of a familiar object. This can be done by determining the identities of the prototype modules that respond above some threshold. For example, if, say, the cat, the sheep and the cow modules are the only ones that respond, the stimulus is probably a four-legged animal.
Place Figure 4 here
Features of similarity
In Chorus, the response of each classi er p i is, in a sense, a feature, whose value for a stimulus A 2 R is signi ed by the activation p i (A). Consider the similarity structure induced by this feature space over the universe of stimuli. A natural way to measure similarity between two stimuli, A and B, is by the Euclidean distance between the corresponding feature vectors, p(A) and p(B):
. However, a uniform scaling in the responses of all prototype detectors p ! c p (as in seeing through fog) should not be interpreted as a change in the shape of the stimulus object. To make the similarity insensitive to such scaling, let us de ne similarity by the cosine of the angle between p(A) and p(B), in the space spanned by the prototype responses:
This de nition of similarity must, however, be further modi ed, for two reasons. First, s a is independent of context, whereas perceived similarity depends on the \contrast set" against which it is to be judged. Second, s a is symmetric, whereas human perception of similarity appears to be asymmetric in many cases (Tversky, 1977 ). To make s a depend on the context, one can introduce a vector of weights, one per prototype, such that w i = w i (fA; B; C; : : :g). Thus, comparing A and B in two contexts, fA; B j C; D; Eg and fA; B j F; G; Hg, may result in di erent values of similarity between A and B. To model the asymmetry which frequently arises when subjects are required to estimate the similarity of some stimulus A to another stimulus B, one may observe, following Mumford (1991) , that subjects in this case behave as if they take \A is similar to B" to mean \B is some kind of prototype in a category which includes A. Thus, the stimulus input A being analyzed is treated di erently from the memory benchmark B" (Mumford, 1991a; Medin et al., 1993) . To give B the required distinction, each feature p i (B) can be weighted in proportion to its long-term saliency sal(p i ; B) in distinguishing between B and the other stimuli. The resulting expression for similarity, which provides for the e ects of context and for asymmetry, is
Note that this de nition has the same form as the additive clustering (ADCLUS) similarity measure of (Shepard and Arabie, 1979) , which, in turn, instantiates Tversky's (1977) discrete contrast model of feature-based similarity. At the same time, it is built on top of a continuous metric representational substrate { the shape space spanned by proximities to prototypes. The degree of compromise between these two approaches to similarity may depend on the demands of the task at hand, via the parameters of equation 2. At the one extreme, a Chorus-based system may behave as if it maps the stimuli pertaining to a task into a metric space, with the ensuing symmetric similarity and possible interaction among di erent dimensions; the other extreme may involve discrete all-or-none features, as in the examples surveyed by Tversky (1977) .
6 Representation of similarity and other theories of what the brain may be doing 6.1 Similarity and memory-based generalization Shepard's (1968) notion of second-order isomorphism is the closest to the present one among the previously proposed approaches to the understanding of representation. Interestingly, the computational approach to second-order isomorphism in Chorus is related to another work by Shepard | his law of generalization, which points out that the likelihood of obtaining the same response to two stimuli decreases exponentially with their separation in a psychological space, as de ned, e.g., by multidimensional scaling (Shepard, 1987) . Within a connectionist framework, Shepard's law of generalization can be implemented in a straightforward manner, by constructing tuned units that exhibit radially symmetric exponential decay around the location of the preferred stimulus in a feature space (Hanson and Gluck, 1993; Shepard and Kannappan, 1993) . However, it is computationally rather more interesting to note what happens when the radial \receptive eld" of an exponential-decay unit is turned into an ellipsoidal one, by training the unit to ignore changes along some of the feature-space dimensions. In particular, if viewpoint-related changes in the appearance of a 3D shape to which the unit is tuned come to be ignored (e.g., through learning), the unit becomes a device capable of measuring the shape-space distance between the current stimulus and the optimal one. As we have seen in section 4, from here it is one step towards an implementation of the idea of representation by second-order isomorphism; all one has to do is have a number of tuned units acting in parallel.
A computational mechanism that is particularly suitable for the implementation of the tuned units is the regularization network (Poggio and Girosi, 1990) . The simplicity of learning from examples in such networks, and the relatively straightforward manner in which they can be mapped onto the neurobiology of the brain prompted Poggio to suggest that the function of the brain may, in fact, be largely that of a exible memory, capable of learning from examples and of similaritybased classi cation (Poggio, 1990; cf. Marr, 1970) . It is important to realize, however, that neither these, nor many other learning-based approaches found in the literature can by themselves solve the problem of representation as posed in the introduction. The reason for this is that representation is not a problem of associating (whether by learning or otherwise) a proper output with a given input, simply because that which counts as \proper" di ers from task to task (unless the world is represented by its replica, a choice that merely postpones the hard decisions by one stage). Thus, while di erent views of the same object are clearly to be associated with a constant response or mapped into a canonical view (Poggio and Edelman, 1990) , there does not seem to be a useful universally valid speci cation of the proper response to a novel shape, e.g., one that is a parametric blend of two familiar shapes. Note that Chorus adopts the basic learning strategy by letting units become loosely tuned to certain familiar shape classes (invariantly over dimensions that are irrelevant to shape, such as viewpoint), but avoids the above pitfall by letting the existing tuned units collectively represent novel shapes, in a manner which allows their localization in an underlying low-dimensional shape space.
The new Pandemonium
The tuned modules of which Chorus is composed can be considered as \holistic" feature detectors, where the i'th feature of the stimulus is its similarity to the i'th reference object. 7 The concept of a feature detector originally developed under the in uence of the discovery of \bug detectors" in the frog retina (Lettvin et al., 1959) , and was linked to the notion of behavior-releasing mechanisms, borrowed from ethology (Barlow, 1979) . Its generalization to higher perceptual functions such as shape recognition was subsequently attempted. A well-known proposal for an object recognition scheme based on feature detectors | the Pandemonium (Selfridge, 1959; Lindsay and Norman, 1977 ) | consisted of a three-level hierarchy: feature demons (responsible for the detection of lines, corners, etc.), cognitive demons (responsible for entire objects) and a master demon (responsible for the recognition decision). The limited in uence of the Pandemonium model on computer vision (as opposed to psychological theories of shape processing) can be traced to two shortcomings.
The rst problem with the Pandemonium is the choice of all-or-none primitive features, such as edges, corners, etc. This choice, which clearly violates Marr's (1976) principle of least commitment, is likely to lead to the loss of valuable information at an early processing stage; within the framework of section 2, it can be seen to render the distal to proximal mapping non-smooth, lessening the likelihood of veridical representation. This situation can be amended, if probabilistic features are used instead. According to this approach, sensory coding is \... the process of preparing a representation of the current sensory scene in a form that enables subsequent learning mechanisms to be versatile and reliable" (Barlow, 1990; Barlow, 1994) . Speci cally, a representation is useful for learning if it includes records of recurring and co-occurring events. In Barlow's Probabilistic Pandemonium, the response strength of a demon would be proportional to ? log P , where P is the probability of occurrence of the feature the demon detects (cf. Intrator and Cooper, 1992) .
The second problem with the Pandemonium lies at the level of decision-making (the \master demon"), where the stimulus is essentially described by the identity of the strongest-responding \cognitive demon." This winner-take-all decision (another violation of the principle of least commitment) does provide some information about the stimulus (namely, the identity of a reference stimulus to which the current one is the most similar), while discarding much more; the representation it provides quali es only as nearest-neighbor-preserving, according to the terminology of section 3. Chorus improves on this by retaining the responses of a number of cognitive demons.
Top-down e ects
A number of recent theories postulate an interplay between bottom-up and top-down in uences in the processing of perceptual information (Carpenter et al., 1991; Carpenter et al., 1992; Mumford, 1991b; Mumford, 1992; Ullman, 1995) . The top-down direction seem to be particularly important in theories which hold that the goal of perceptual processing is nding an optimal (e.g., minimum description length) \explanation" for the stimulus (Bienenstock and Geman, 1995) . In this respect, Chorus constitutes an attempt to nd out how far an almost purely bottom-up approach to representation can be taken. This attempt is motivated by the belief that visual scenes can be normally disambiguated in a bottom-up fashion, with the minimal involvement of top-down guidance (mainly in the form of attention shifts).
Although evidence from neurobiology (surveyed, e.g., in Ullman, 1995) clearly suggests that information can ow from the higher to the lower cortical areas and to the thalamus, the compu- The holistic nature of these features stems from the possibility of a reference shape being an entire object, rather than, say, a generic part. tational role of that direction of ow of information, including the very involvement of top-down in uences in run-of-the-mill perceptual tasks, is debatable. According to the theory proposed here, top-down e ects do play a role in representation, albeit a less central one than suggested by some. Speci cally, in Chorus top-down in uences are called for in deciding which stimuli are to be retained as reference objects, in gathering the statistical salience data for each reference object (section 5), and in control-related chores such as the computation of the target for the next xation (cf. Koch and Ullman, 1985) . Arguably, mixing the bottom-up and the top-down e ects in this proportion would allow a perceptual system to achieve an acceptable compromise between computational effort and representational power. Perceiving the hidden causes of things is a feat worthy of Sherlock Holmes, and the human visual system seems to be capable of it, given enough time and a challenging task such as separating gure from ground in an underexposed photograph (Mumford, 1994, p.133) . In less unique situations, including a variety of controlled experimental conditions, the performance of a perceptual Dr. Watson (\merely" making sense of the stimulus, as detailed in the next section, instead of accounting for each and every pixel, as expected from a Holmes) seems to be a goal both worthy of pursuit and more readily attainable.
Perception of similarity
According to the proposed theory of representation, to make sense of a stimulus means to locate it in a low-dimensional psychological space which (1) is inhabited by similar stimuli and (2) stands in a principled relationship to a low-dimensional physical space, such as a common parameterization of the stimulus set. The main tool in testing the predictions of this theory is multidimensional scaling (MDS), a computational procedure for embedding a set of points, one per stimulus, into a metric space in such a manner that the inter-point distances conform as closely as possible to perceived similarities (proximities) between the points, as measured in some psychophysical procedure (Kruskal and Wish, 1978; Shepard, 1980) .
Background
Usually, MDS is employed in an exploratory mode, as follows. After the data are collected, the stimuli are embedded into a low-dimensional space, and the resulting con guration is inspected. The analysis is considered successful if the dimensions of the (psychological, or proximal) embedding space are correlated with some (physical, or distal) variables involved in the generation of the stimuli, and if the con guration of the stimuli in that space is meaningful. Among the examples of this procedure given in (Shepard, 1980) , one nds the application of MDS to the processing of perceived similarities between Morse signals (the data were obtained by asking unskilled subjects to decide whether two consecutively sounded signals were same or di erent). The two dimensions of the embedding space in that example correspond to the number of components and the proportion of dots and dashes. Another example is the near-circular arrangement of colors in 2D, obtained by MDS from a table of judged similarities between color patches; this result supported Newton's suggestion to represent hues by points on a circle.
In the domain of shape perception, MDS has been applied in the analysis of perceived similarities among relatively simple 2D gures (rectangles, random irregular polygons), but the most spectacular results have been achieved in two studies that involved more complex shapes. In the rst of these studies, subjects were requested to judge (from memory) the similarity of shapes of 15 of the US states (Shepard and Chipman, 1970) . The 2D con gurations obtained by MDS were surprisingly consistent across subjects, and also made sense geometrically (i.e., states of similar elongation and shape were grouped together). Shepard and Chipman point out that the ndings of (1) very much the same con guration whether the states were pictorially displayed or only imagined, along with (2) the relationship, in both cases, between the recovered con guration and the actual cartographic shapes, support the idea of a second-order isomorphism between internal representations and their corresponding external objects.
In the second study, the stimuli (2D closed contours) were created parametrically, in such a manner that the set of shapes formed a toroidal con guration in the parameter space (Shepard and Cermak, 1973) . The perceived similarities paralleled closely the parameter-space distances among the stimuli. Shepard and Cermak also report some interesting patterns of clustering that subjects imposed on the stimuli when prompted to consider possible categorical labels (such as \ sh" or \jet plane") that could be applied to the (originally unmarked) 2D contours; these ndings support the assertion, made in section 2.1, that a metric-space representation of similarity does not contradict the possibility of category-related e ects, and, in fact, can provide the requisite substrate for the emergence of those e ects.
Explorations of shape space
To obtain a more direct support for the second-order isomorphism idea, it is necessary to exert control over the original con guration built into the stimuli; the success of the recovery of that con guration from subject data can then be quanti ed and judged statistically. This corresponds to an application of MDS in a con rmatory, rather than exploratory, mode | an approach that can only be pursued with shapes that are generated with computer graphics and are controlled parametrically.
The veridicality of representation of parametrically de ned 3D shapes in human subjects has been tested in two recent studies (Edelman, 1995a; Cutzu and Edelman, 1995) . In each of a series of experiments, which involved pairwise similarity judgment, delayed matching to sample, and long-term memory recall, subjects were confronted with several classes of computer-rendered 3D animal-like shapes, arranged in a complex pattern in a common parameter space. Response time and error rate data were combined into a measure of perceived pairwise shape similarities, and the object to object proximity matrix was submitted to nonmetric MDS. In the resulting solution, the relative geometrical arrangement of the points corresponding to the di erent objects invariably re ected the complex low-dimensional structure in parameter space that de ned the relationships between the stimuli classes (see Figure 5 ). 8 Place Figure 5 here Computer simulations showed that the recovery of the low-dimensional structure from imagespace distances between the stimuli was impossible, as expected. In comparison, the psychophysical results were fully replicated by a Chorus-like model, patterned after a higher stage of object processing, in which nearly viewpoint-invariant representations of individual objects are available; a rough analogy is to the inferotemporal visual area IT; see, e.g., (Tanaka, 1993; Logothetis et al., 1995) . As pointed out in section 4, such a representation of a 3D object can be easily formed, if several views of the object are available, by training a classi er such as a radial basis function (RBF) network to interpolate a characteristic function for the object in the space of all views of all objects (Poggio 8 This nding has been recently replicated psychophysically in the monkey (Sugihara et al., 1996) . and Edelman, 1990) . A number of reference objects (in Figure 5 , the corners of the parameter-space Cross) were chosen, and a separate RBF network was trained to recognize each such object (i.e., to output a constant value for any of its views, encoded by the activities of the underlying receptive eld layer; cf. Figure 3) . At the RBF level, the similarity between two stimuli was de ned as the cosine of the angle between the vectors of outputs they evoked in the RBF modules trained on the reference objects (equation 1). The MDS-derived con gurations obtained with this model showed signi cant resemblance to the true parameter-space con gurations (see Figure 5 , right).
Further predictions
The experiments mentioned above and the accompanying simulations indicate that the human visual system is capable of forming an internal representation of a set of stimuli which is isomorphic to the original in Shepard's sense, and, furthermore, that a simple implementation of the Chorus scheme can exhibit a comparable capability for veridical representation. While the psychophysical ndings support the idea of representation by second-order isomorphism, they are also compatible with the possibility that the visual system reconstructs each stimulus in full detail, in which case the isomorphism is obtained trivially.
One way to distinguish between these alternatives experimentally is to look in the data for traits that are peculiar to Chorus, and are not easily explained by a reconstructionist model. Speci cally, it should be possible:
To predict, for each subject, the distortion in the MDS con guration for one parameter-space pattern, given the distortion of another pattern. A better prediction is expected from the Chorus model, compared to a generic 2D warping scheme that does not rely on distances to reference points. To quantify the importance of parameter-space distances from the stimulus to preset reference points. A stronger e ect of the change of these distances is expected, compared to a parameterspace movement that preserves the relative distances to the reference points. To test the nature of reference shapes, using priming. Stronger priming is expected for familiar shapes (including the so-called \impossible" objects), relative to less familiar ones. In comparison, the generic reconstructionist hypothesis, according to which representations are constructed \on the y" by putting together universal primitives, predicts uniform priming for all objects, and less priming for the \impossible" ones.
Neurobiology of similarity
The approach to representation based on a smooth distal to proximal mapping, and its implementation by the bank of classi ers, lead to explicit predictions regarding the mechanisms of object processing at the higher levels of the primate visual system. Speci cally, one expects to nd there units responding preferentially to certain objects, with the response falling o monotonically with dissimilarity between the stimulus and the preferred object, while staying nearly constant over di erent views of the preferred object (cf. Figure 3) .
Although rst reports of cells in the monkey inferotemporal cortex that respond preferentially to faces date back more than two decades (Gross et al., 1972) , cells tuned to general objects have been found only recently. In particular, Tanaka and his group reported the desired selectivity for speci c (mostly 2D) objects in recordings from the inferotemporal cortex (Fujita et al., 1992; Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994; Tanaka, 1992; Tanaka, 1993) . More recently, Logothetis, Pauls and Poggio (1995) reported recordings from cells tuned to speci c views of 3D objects on which the monkey had been trained. A small proportion of the object-tuned cells found by Logothetis et al. responded each to a limited subset of the objects, irrespective of view.
None of the above experiments involved parametric manipulation of the stimulus shape | a crucial component in testing the predictions of the theory of representation proposed here. In another study, where such manipulation was attempted, the stimuli were complex parametrically de ned periodic 2D patterns (Sakai, Naya and Miyashita, 1994) . In that study, the response of cells was found to decrease monotonically with parameter-space distance between the test stimulus and the preferred pattern to which the cells were tuned. With parametrically controlled 3D stimuli, it should be possible to look for cells that behave similarly to the RBF module whose behavior is illustrated in Figure 3 . The speci c predictions are as follows:
The cell will respond equally to di erent views of its preferred object, but its response will decrease with parameter-space distance from the point corresponding the shape of the preferred object (three such cells have been reported by Logothetis et al., 1995) . The responses of a number of cells, each tuned to a di erent reference object, will carry su cient information for classifying novel stimuli of the same general category as the reference objects. If the pattern of stimuli has a simple low-dimensional characterization in some underlying parameter space (as in Figure 5 , left), it will be recoverable from the ensemble response of a number of cells, using multidimensional scaling. 9 Discussion 9.1 Similarity: the raw and the processed In shape perception, traditionally, the foremost information-processing challenge has been to achieve object constancy, that is, to perceive the object's shape despite wide variations in its visual appearance, caused by changes in the illumination and in the object's position with respect to the observer. The proponents of constancy observe, with Heraclitus, who pointed out that one cannot step into the same river twice, that people literally never see the same object twice: objects are scaled up or down, translate, rotate, articulate, deform, are lit or shadowed, and are occluded by other objects or obscured by fog.
This observation is both true and misleading. Stressing the in uence of the viewing conditions on the appearance of objects tacitly assumes that it is the exact shape of the object that a representational system should attempt to recover. However, as students of categorization know well, an intelligent agent is much better o representing an object on a number of hierarchical levels of abstraction (with the option of attending to high-resolution details, if the object happens to be present in front of the observer, and if the task demands it), than storing a high-resolution replica of the object, and facing the problem of separating the cha (pixel-level information) from the wheat (classi cation information) every time a new instance of that same object class is encountered.
When considered with the goal of proper representation of similarity in mind, the problem of variability of object appearance assumes somewhat di erent proportions. At the computational level, instead of seeking absolute invariance with respect to the extraneous view-related parameters, a system can settle for mere tolerance, as determined by the interplay of within-and betweencategory similarities. At the implementational level, the availability of learning modules that can be trained to compensate for the variability in object appearance shifts the focus from the easier problems in vision (of which invariance seems to be an example) to the more challenging ones, such as making sense of objects not previously seen. The Chorus scheme, built around a theory of representation of similarity, and implemented by a bank of trainable modules tuned to reference objects, embodies both the computational and the implementational-level lessons stated above.
Philosophical implications
Some of the philosophical implications of the Chorus scheme have been mentioned brie y in (Edelman, 1995b) ; here, I discuss at a greater length the place of the proposed theory in the current philosophical debate on the nature of representation, stressing its relationship with the increasingly in uential idea of the world as an external memory.
Locke's conformity and Shepard's second-order isomorphism
In describing the implementation of Chorus (section 4), I have suggested that the modules tuned to speci c shapes can be considered as feature detectors, spanning a feature space in which each dimension codes similarity to a particular object class. The idea of a feature detector as a basic ingredient of a representational system can be traced back to John Locke, who was among the rst to fully realize the infeasibility of Aristotelian representation by resemblance. Because the ring of a feature detector is an event which is internal to the representational system, this raises immediately the problem of grounding (cf. Harnad, 1990 ) the representation in reality:
1. Objection. \Knowledge placed in our ideas may be all unreal or chimerical." : : : If our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them, and reach no further, where there is something further intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain : : : 2. Answer: "Not so, where ideas agree with things." Locke, 1690, Book IV (Of Knowledge and Probability), Chapter IV.]
The principle on which Locke based his answer to the grounding problem is that of \conformity," postulated to prevail between the representations and their objects. As is well known, Locke distinguished between simple and complex ideas, each kind with its own grounds for conformity. Consider rst the former, somewhat less problematic, kind. The argument here was that \: : : the idea of whiteness, or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have, with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is su cient for real knowledge." (Locke 1690, Book IV, Chapter IV, 4) . In terms of feature detectors, this is a statement of belief in the availability of reliable detectors for immediate perceptual qualities.
The nding of cells tuned to well-de ned features such as patterns of motion (Movshon et al., 1985; Newsome and Par e, 1988) , 2D shapes (Tanaka et al., 1991; Kobatake and Tanaka, 1994) , or faces (Gross et al., 1972; Perrett et al., 1982) supports this part of Lockean doctrine, and, in fact, suggests that it may be extended from \simple" features to entire objects. The impact of this evidence seems to have been limited by a persistent concern that the feature detectors do not \really" detect the features they happen to be tuned to (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1987; Cummins, 1989) . 9 Nevertheless, it has been suggested (Albright, 1991) that philosophical worries regarding possibility of Lockean conformity in the functioning of feature detectors found in the brain should be quelled to some extent by the successful manipulation of the organism's perception of a feature through the injection of current in the vicinity of the appropriate detector pool in the cortex (Salzman et al., 1990) .
More importantly, in the light of the possibility of veridical representation of distal changes by proximal ones, as in Shepard's (1968) theory of second-order isomorphism, the philosophical lure of settling the question regarding what this or that individual feature detector \really" detects is signi cantly reduced. Moreover, the problematic distinction between simple and complex ideas suggested by Locke can be given up: in Chorus, the \feature detectors" can be tuned to arbitrarily complex objects, yet serve as primitives just as learnable (by ostension; see Quine, 1969) and as immediately perceivable as Locke's simple ideas. At the same time, if second-order isomorphism can be made to work, Locke's \conformity" acquires a new concrete meaning: the order and the connection of ideas is identical to the order and the connection of things. 10 9.2.2 A new angle on compositionality According to this view, a representational system need not possess a combinatorial mechanism for creating complex \ideas" out of simple ones. In vision, the hypothesis of the combinatorial structure of concepts assumes the guise of part-based theories of object representation (Biederman, 1987; Bienenstock and Geman, 1995) . The debate between theories that involve dynamically bound generic parts and prototype-based theories parallels the classical dispute between Empiricist and Rationalist theories of concepts, in which the main argument against prototype-based theories is their alleged failure to support compositionality and productivity (Fodor, 1981, p.296) . That argument, however, hinges on a logicist approach, which does not recognize any way of combining simple concepts into complex ones, short of logical/syntactical connectives.
On Fodor's interpretation of Empiricism, a system equipped with, say, three object-speci c modules, tuned to a cat, a dog, and a gira e, has only three (indivisible) visual concepts: cat, dog, and gira e. In fact, however, such a system should be certainly capable of veridically representing any shape within the convex hull of the three reference shapes (in a common shape space, as de ned by any member of a family of possible parameterizations), and probably also capable of representing a great variety of other animal-like shapes. The logicist approach here fails because the insistence on logic e ectively forces the violation of the principle of least commitment. If the stimulus is compared simultaneously to a number of graded prototypes, instead of being subjected to a Pandemonium-like all-or-none logical/syntactic analysis, the productivity problem vanishes, along with the premise for Fodor's argument.
The world as its own representation
In a passage intended to de ect criticism coming from the proponents of fuzzy-set interpretation of the notion of a prototype, Fodor (1981, p.297 ) admits that prototype theories may be able to handle the combinatorics of de ning the extension of terms, but not their sense. Extension, however, may be all there is to a representation.
Indeed, the idea of second-order isomorphism places the burden of representation where it belongs | in the world. In Chorus, the ensemble of feature detectors responds (J. J. Gibson would say, resonates) to the environment (while extracting task-speci c information), without reconstructing it internally. By merely mirroring proximally the similarity structure of a distal shape space, Chorus embodies the ideas of those philosophers who argued that \meaning ain't in the head" (Putnam, 1988) and that \cognitive systems are largely in the world" (Millikan, 1995) , circumvents the severe di culties encountered by the reconstructionist approaches in computer vision, and may explain the impressive performance of biological visual systems, which, in any case, appear to be too sloppy to do a good job of reconstructing the world geometrically (O'Regan, 1992) . Thus, in an important sense, Chorus lets the world be its own representation.
Qualia
If the world is its own representation, how are we to explain phenomenological qualia (Goodman, 1977) such as the redness of a tomato or the shape of a gourd, as perceived subjectively? The Aristotelian representation by similarity appealingly solves the qualia problem by equating these perceptual qualities with the physical qualities of the corresponding percepts (i.e., the internal representations). Thus, a shift towards the view of representation of similarity carries with it a price. The standard version of the problem of qualia seems to be actually exacerbated: on the face of it, it is more di cult to explain the apparent richness of the perceived world, if one denies that the shape of each of the constituent objects is in itself fully represented.
A solution to this problem is suggested by the realization that the apparent richness of the perceived world is, well, apparent (Dennett, 1991) . The source of this illusion may lie in the immediate availability of the information in the world, which acts as an \external store" (O'Regan, 1992) . 11 A growing amount of psychophysical data supports this view (Pollatsek et al., 1984; O'Regan, 1992; Blackmore et al., 1995; Rensink et al., 1995; Grimes, 1995) ; for a note of caution from the psychophysical establishment, see (Cavanagh, 1995) .
Concluding remarks
I have presented a theory of shape representation, based on Shepard's notion of second-order isomorphism between the similarity structure of the internal representation space and that of the world of objects. The highlights of the proposed theory are as follows:
Formal veridicality. Representations are grounded in physical reality. This is expressed by a correspondence between proximal and distal similarities, which, under certain conditions, allows for formal veridicality. Unifying approach. The representational substrate is a feature space, spanned by similarities to reference objects. The feature-space approach o ers the possibility of a smooth integration between the processing of shape and of other visual dimensions. Furthermore, it provides a common representational substrate for cognitive tasks at di erent levels of categorization. Learnability. Representations can be learned from examples, using a well-understood computational mechanism (regularization networks).
Empirical support. There is a natural mapping of representation of similarity onto well-de ned neurophysiological mechanisms (ensembles of tuned units). This mapping is indirectly supported by psychophysical data, and by a functional-level simulation in an arti cial neural network model. Philosophical appeal. The proposed theory takes a clear stand on philosophical issues that have been intensely debated for a long time. It also o ers an opportunity to increase the productivity of the debate, by encouraging the consideration of relevant arguments from adjacent disciplines.
To conclude, let us return to the Riddle of Representation, as posed in the introduction: by virtue of what does the representational state of a human observer seeing a cat on a mat refer to that cat (Cummins, 1989) ? A slightly di erent formulation of this riddle | what is common to two humans, a robot, and a Martian, who all see a cat on a mat? | may actually point towards a solution: it seems likely that the only thing that can be common to these four representational systems is the cat itself, sitting \out there" on the mat. One way to implement the idea of the world as its own representation is by constructing a system that has at its disposal tunable modules which can be trained to respond to cats or dogs or any other object. Such a system will be representing a cat when it sees one (by virtue of ring of the appropriate modules), and will be able also to dream of a cat or imagine one (if the modules are made to re in the absence of an immediate sensory stimulation). Moreover, if a selection of modules (not more than a few hundred), each tuned to a di erent class of stimuli, is available, the system should be able also to represent (and categorize, and imagine) many more stimuli in addition to those actually stored in memory. Clustering by natural kinds, and its representation that ful lls the requirement of secondorder isomorphism, according to Shepard (1968) . The disposition of the tokens corresponding to the three shapes in this illustration in the proximal representation space (bottom) re ects the disposition of the shapes in the distal shape space (top); the shapes of the tokens are immaterial to their representational capacities.
Figure 2: The image space, R (depicted here as 3-dimensional, to facilitate visualization), and some of its subspaces (see section 4.1). Two exemplars, E 11 and E 12 , belong to the same class C 1 (the class of 4-legged animal shapes). Some of the di erent views of E 11 are shown (marked by open circles), along with its view space, V 1 . The surface patch represents a part of the shape space S; the view spaces of the individual objects are transversal to it. A morphing sequence originating at E 12 and leading to two other shapes is illustrated by the dashed curve contained in S. Movement towards the upper right corner of S corresponds to a reduction in the resemblance between the resulting image and the images of coherently looking objects. Figure 3 : The response of a radial basis function module, trained on 10 random views of a parametrically de ned object, to stimuli di ering from a reference view of that object (marked by the big circle), in three ways: (1) by progressive view change, marked by 's; (2) by progressive shape change, marked by 's; (3) by combined shape and view change, marked by 's. The points along each curve have been sorted by pixel-space distance between the test and the reference stimuli (shown along the abscissa). Points are means over 10 repetitions with di erent random view-space and shape-space directions of change; a typical error bar ( standard error of the mean) is shown for each curve. Note the insensitivity of the module's output to view-space changes, relative to shape-space changes. Figure 5 : Left: the parameter-space con guration used for generating the stimuli in one of the experiments described in (Cutzu and Edelman, 1995) . Middle: the 2D MDS solution for all subjects. Symbols: { true con guration; { con guration derived by MDS from the subject data, then Procrustes-transformed (Borg and Lingoes, 1987) to t the true one. Lines connect corresponding points. The coe cient of congruence between the MDS-derived con guration and the true one was 0:99 (expected random value, estimated by bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993 ) from the data: 0:86 0:03, mean and std dev; 100 permutations of the point order were used in the bootstrap computation). The Procrustes distance between the MDS-derived con guration and the true one was 0:66 (expected random value: 3:14 0:15). Right: the 2D MDS solution for the RBF model; coe cient of congruence: 0:98 (expected random value: 0:86 0:03); Procrustes distance: 1:11 (expected random value: 3:14 0:17).
